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This Article replies briefly to the robust response that Professor 
Frank O. Bowman III submitted in answer to my earlier contribution 
to this Issue.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
My good friend and valued colleague Frank O. Bowman III has per-
formed a laudable service in taking the time to respond at length to my earlier 
contribution to this Issue.  Among other things, he provides a careful exami-
nation of the Missouri grand jury process, including the necessity of the pros-
ecutor’s signature for a valid indictment.  Further, he offers the perspective of 
someone who, unlike me, has presented evidence to grand juries and accord-
ingly has a different view on their strengths, weaknesses, and importance to 
the criminal justice system more broadly.  I appreciate the effort and his will-
ingness to engage with my arguments, which he could not “in good con-
science leave . . . unanswered.”1  Recognizing the limited space remaining in 
this Issue, as well as the tight schedule under which the Missouri Law Review 
operates, I will reply here only to a few of Professor Bowman’s arguments. 
In particular, Professor Bowman relies heavily on the distinction be-
tween a “true bill” – that is, a grand jury finding of probable cause – and a 
valid indictment.2  Without denying the technical accuracy of the distinction, 
I dispute whether the distinction can support all of the weight placed upon it. 
In addition, Professor Bowman advances a policy argument to the effect 
that grand jury deliberations in sensational cases boost public confidence in 
the justice system and that dispensing with the ritual would create risks to 
public safety.  Relying on recent events in Cleveland and in St. Louis itself, I 
dispute this empirical claim. 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law.  I thank the 
Missouri Law Review for providing room for this debate between Professor Bowman 
and me. 
 1. Frank O. Bowman III, Vox Populi: Robert McCulloch, Ferguson & the Roles 
of Prosecutors and Grand Juries in High-Profile Cases, 80 MO. L. REV. 1111, 1112 
(2015).  See also Duty Calls, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/386/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2016) 
(“Someone is wrong on the Internet.”). 
 2. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 1114–15. 
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Finally, I take a moment to clarify what I did – and what I did not – ar-
gue in my earlier Article.3 
II.  THE “CLEFT STICK” OF AN UNWANTED TRUE BILL 
Professor Bowman devotes substantial attention to the Missouri re-
quirement that a “true bill” be signed by the prosecutor before it becomes a 
valid indictment.4  His analysis is correct, and I do not dispute it.  I do not 
believe, however, that the distinction invalidates my argument in the manner 
that Professor Bowman appears to conclude.  Indeed, Professor Bowman 
himself illustrates the hazard inherent in allowing grand juries to deliberate 
after prosecutors have decided that indictments are undesirable.  After writing 
in the main text that “Mr. McCulloch’s silence before the grand jury did not 
even create a heightened risk that Wilson would be formally charged” be-
cause “in the unlikely event it returned a true bill, Mr. McCulloch would de-
cline to sign and file it,”5 he provides a telling footnote: 
Of course, if Mr. McCulloch really was resolved not to prosecute Of-
ficer Wilson, return of a true bill would truly have put him in a cleft 
stick, forcing him to decide whether to take responsibility for overrul-
ing the grand jury’s opinion or to take what he presumably thought an 
unwinnable case to trial.  But the grand jury did not return an indict-
ment, so we will never know what he might have done.6 
True, no undesired true bill arose in the Darren Wilson case.  But 
McCulloch’s good fortune should not blind us to the risks of tempting fate.  I 
am breaking no new ground in asserting that one should not needlessly ex-
pose himself to ethical temptations.7  It may be the case that McCulloch is a 
person of such probity that an unexpected true bill would literally not even 
have “create[d] a heightened risk” of Wilson being charged – that is, that the 
odds of an indictment would truly have been completely unaffected by the 
grand jury’s surprising decision – but we should generally craft social poli-
cies that work for flawed human beings in addition to ethical supermen. 
 
 3. For the earlier Article, see Ben Trachtenberg, No, You “Stand Up”: Why 
Prosecutors Should Stop Hiding Behind Grand Juries, 80 MO. L. REV. 1099 (2015). 
 4. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 1115 (“Unless and until an indictment ap-
proved by the grand jury is signed by the prosecutor, there is no ‘charge’ against the 
defendant, no ‘prosecution’ has been initiated, and the defendant has no case to an-
swer.”). 
 5. Id. at 1121. 
 6. Id. at 1121 n.40. 
 7. See, e.g., Matthew 6:13 (“And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us 
from evil.”); W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM, OF HUMAN BONDAGE 375 (The Floating Press 
2009) (1915) (“I should be false to the trust laid upon me by your dead father and 
mother if I allowed you to expose yourself to such temptation.”). 
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In short, Professor Bowman is correct that a true bill by itself presents 
“[a] defendant . . . no case to answer.”8  Similarly, a loaded handgun left on a 
table will expel no bullet until someone picks it up.  Notwithstanding this 
truism about firearms, one would be wise not to leave them in places where 
they might tempt passersby into mischief.  And a prosecutor should not, ab-
sent good cause, risk the delivery of true bills in cases where she does not 
wish to bring indictments. 
III.  PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN PROSECUTORS AND THE PREVENTION OF 
RIOTS 
The question then becomes whether there exists good cause for allowing 
grand jurors to deliberate after a prosecutor decides no indictment is desired.  
More precisely, the question is whether whatever benefits are associated with 
such deliberations outweigh the costs, which include the risks described 
above as well as wasting the time of the grand jurors, who would prefer to be 
elsewhere.9 
Professor Bowman identifies one benefit that merits serious considera-
tion: public safety.  Considering what McCulloch might have done had he 
“indeed concluded that no probable cause existed” to charge Wilson with a 
crime, Professor Bowman suggests that McCulloch could have “withdraw[n] 
the matter from the grand jury’s consideration and bar[red] them from delib-
erating on the ground that he believed no probable cause existed.”10  He then 
dismisses the idea, arguing that such action “would have guaranteed a riot 
and immediate charges of a prosecutorial whitewash.”11  In light of the events 
that followed McCulloch’s announcement of the grand jury’s deliberations, it 
is difficult to argue that the final two days of deliberations prevented civil 
unrest or inspired confidence in the criminal justice system.12 
In a more recent case that has similarly captured national attention, an 
Ohio grand jury declined to indict anyone for the killing of Tamir Rice, a 
 
 8. Bowman, supra note 1, at 1115 (emphasis omitted). 
 9. See Trachtenberg, supra note 3, at 1106 & n.31 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 
494.450 (Cum. Supp. 2013)); St. Louis County Jury Information, ST. LOUIS CTY., 
http://stlouisco.com/YourGovernment/CountyDepartments/StLouisCountyCircuitCou
rt/JuryInformation/jurypay (last visited Feb. 19, 2016) (describing low pay provided 
to Missouri jurors as well as threat of contempt proceedings for those who evade 
service). 
 10. Bowman, supra note 1, at 1121–22. 
 11.   Id. at 1122. 
 12. To be fair to Professor Bowman, he acknowledges this fact: “As it turned 
out, a riot happened anyway.  And Mr. McCulloch was accused of manipulating the 
grand jury anyway.”  Id.  For a contemporaneous report, see Monica Davey & Julie 
Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-
shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html (“Several police cars were burned . . . .  
Flights to Lambert-St. Louis International Airport were not permitted to land . . . .”). 
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twelve-year-old boy shot dead by police in Cleveland.13  After presenting 
evidence to the grand jury, the office of Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Timo-
thy J. McGinty told the grand jurors what it believed was the proper result.  
“The prosecutors . . . told grand jurors that they did not believe charges were 
warranted against the officers involved in Tamir’s death . . . .”14  The protests 
that followed the announcement of the grand jury’s decision “included sever-
al tense moments but remained peaceful.”15 
The data points from Ferguson and Cleveland certainly do not prove that 
when a prosecutor does not desire an indictment, allowing jurors to deliberate 
without knowing the prosecutor’s opinion somehow causes civil unrest.  
Nonetheless, in St. Louis County, the prosecutor left things in the hands of 
the grand jury, and civil unrest ensued.  In Cleveland, the prosecutor explicit-
ly told the grand jury that no indictment was warranted, and peace pre-
vailed.16  If Professor Bowman wishes to convince us that my proposed strat-
egy – dismissing the grand jurors after the close of evidence17– is truly dan-
gerous, I think he owes us some evidence.  In Missouri, he has got to show 
us. 
IV.  ARGUMENTS MADE AND ARGUMENTS NOT MADE 
Here I will reiterate briefly just what I intended to argue in my initial 
Article.  My primary claim is that “prosecutors should not allow grand juries 
to consider indicting defendants whom the prosecutors themselves do not 
believe should be indicted.”18  Although I also argued that “leaving the grand 
jury to do what it will without any prosecutorial recommendation risks the 
return of unfounded indictments,”19 I did not intend to suggest that superflu-
ous grand jury deliberations, in and of themselves, constitute violations of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct20 or any other law.21  As indicated above,22 
 
13. Cory Shaffer, Tamir Rice Grand Jury Did Vote Whether Shooting Was Justi-
fied, CLEVELAND (Jan. 20, 2016, 8:25 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/
index.ssf/2016/01/tamir_rice_grand_jury_did_vote.html. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Evan MacDonald, New Year’s Eve Protest of Tamir Rice Decision Includes 
Tense Moments but Remains Peaceful, CLEVELAND (Jan. 1, 2016, 1:27 AM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/01/new_years_eve_protest_of_tamir.
html. 
  16.  Shaffer, supra note 13. 
 17. To be precise, I suggested that McCulloch “should have thanked the grand 
jurors for their service, reiterated their important role in his investigation, and then 
sent them home, sparing them two days of needless deliberations.”  Trachtenberg, 
supra note 3, at 1109. 
 18. Id. at 1103. 
 19. Id. at 1100. 
 20. By “Rules of Professional Conduct,” I mean the laws governing lawyers as 
actually enacted in state rules, not the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
themselves have no force of law.  See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 4. 
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however, such deliberations needlessly put prosecutors at risk of significant 
temptation to bring unfounded charges. 
Further, I limited my claim to the time period in which “a prosecutor be-
lieves no indictment is appropriate.”23  It appears, however, that at least some 
readers believe that I oppose the use of investigatory grand juries by prosecu-
tors who are unsure of whether an indictment will eventually be deemed ap-
propriate.24  I do not.  In my earlier Article, I wrote,  
 
There is no problem when a prosecutor presents evidence 
to a grand jury without yet knowing whether an indictment 
is desired.  Among other reasons, it is often the grand jury 
process itself that informs the prosecutor of what action is 
appropriate.  The grand jury also serves useful investigato-
ry functions and allows prosecutors to obtain sworn testi-
mony and thereby “lock in” the stories of various witness-
es.25   
 
My claim concerns only the time after the evidence is in, in cases where a 
prosecutor has decided that given the evidence, no indictment should be 
brought. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Professor Bowman has added some valuable insights to the debate about 
what a prosecutor should do when, after presenting evidence to a grand jury, 
she decides that no indictment is desirable.  If I were more clever, I would 
have asked him to read my prior Article somewhat earlier in the publication 
process, and I then could have incorporated greater detail about just how a 
true bill becomes an indictment, eliminating one of his avenues of attack in 
exchange for a “thank you” buried in some unread footnote.  In the end, how-
ever, I remain convinced that a prosecutor disserves the public when she al-
lows – or, to be more accurate, requires – grand jurors to continue delibera-
tions after the prosecutor has decided she does not want to indict.  Such de-
liberations waste the time of citizens who could more fruitfully or pleasantly 
spend their days elsewhere, they risk leading prosecutors into temptation 
 
 21. Accordingly, I have made no claim that Robert McCulloch (or any other 
prosecutor) has engaged in unethical or unlawful conduct.  Professor Bowman writes 
that I “strongly intimate[d] that Mr. McCulloch’s approach violated standards of pro-
fessional ethics.”  Bowman, supra note 1, at 1112.  That was not my intention.  I 
meant to argue only that McCulloch’s use of the grand jury – after he himself decided 
that an indictment of Darren Wilson was not desirable – was bad policy that other 
prosecutors should not imitate. 
 22. See supra Part II. 
 23. Trachtenberg, supra note 3, at 1100. 
 24. One Missouri prosecutor has contacted me directly to raise this concern.   
 25. Trachtenberg, supra note 3, at 1103 n.12. 
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should an undesired true bill appear, and (at least as far as I am aware) they 
provide neither public confidence in the justice system nor protection against 
civil disturbances.  Absent some evidence of the utility of keeping grand ju-
rors around for superfluous deliberations, prosecutors should dispense with 
the empty ritual. 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/14
